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IN THE
SUPEEME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN LEACH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

NORMA B. ANDERSON and
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY,

CASE NO.
13808

Defendants and Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Omitting the various irrelevancies, innuendos and
arguments contained in Appellants' statement of facts,
a simple statement follows.
Norma Anderson, a business woman in her own
right (R.155), as grantor, created an irrevocable trust
with Valley Bank and Trust Company, as trustee, on
November 12, 1968 (R.61-67). On that date she transferred to NAVALCO, the nominee of the trustee, the
trust assets, both real and personal as set out in the
schedules attached to the Trust Agreement (R.68-71).
The trust assets included all shares of Mrs. Anderson
in the family corporations in which she owned a majority interest (R.171) and also her personal residence
(R.183). The financial statement of Mrs. Anderson
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dated July 6, 1968, showed her assets of about $610,000.00, and a net worth of about $465,000.00 (E.98).
On April 15, 1969 Mrs. Anderson guaranteed payment of a promissory note of Angi Corporation, one
of the Anderson family enterprises, in favor of John
Leach, respondent. On November 29, 1971 the District
Court of Salt Lake County in Civil Action 192,293
awarded judgment to respondent for the principal
amount of the note, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
On March 24, 1972 respondent commenced his action against Mrs. Anderson and Valley Bank and Trust
Company, as trustee, to collect the judgment (E.111).
On August 7, 1974 District Judge James A. Sawaya gave
judgment in favor of respondent against appellants for
$14,680.68, interest and costs (R.17). The Conclusions
of Law on which this judgment was based recite (1)
that the Anderson Trust Agrement was for the use and
benefit of Norma Anderson, the Grantor; (2) that as
to the personal property therein, the Trust Agreement
is void as to respondent as a creditor under Section
25-1-11 U.C.A., and (3) that because of the spendthrift
provision in the Trust Agreement which provides that
no interest of Norma Anderson in the trust shall be
liable to her creditors or subject to legal process, the
trust is void as to the claim of respondent as a creditor
(R.21).
Appellants have appealed from this latter judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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AliGI JMKNT
POINT I
AS TO T H E PEBSONAL
PROPERTY
T H E R E I N , T H E ANDERSON TRUST IS
VOID AS TO RESPONDENT AS A CREDITOR UNDER SECTION 25-1-11 U.C.A.
The District Ceur; :•• hi \\n\i as t;o personal property in the Andersn:/ Trust, the Trust Agreement was
void as to respondent as a creditor of the grantor under
Section 25-1-11 U.C.A., which follows:
"Trust for grantor void - All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or
written, of goods, chattels, or things in action
made in trust for the use of the person making
the same shall be void as against the existing or
subsequent creditors of such person."
This statute is a part of the Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, Title 25, Chapter 1, UCA 1953, and it supplements
the preceding sections of the act. Its purpose is to spell
out protection for creditors of the grantor who has used
the more devious route of debt avoidance by means of a
trust. The title of the section is "Trust for Grantor
Void", and it is aimed expressly at the "trust for the
use of the person making the same". It makes such trusts
void as to existing and subsequent creditors as to personal property in the trusts.
Section 25-1-11 UCA is a codification of the general principles of law as to trusts created for the benefit
of the grantor. 98 ALE 1211 Protection of creditors,
existing and subsequent, is the prime concern of the statDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ute, and proof of fraudulent intent, insolvency or discretion in trustee are immaterial.
Scott on Trusts, Vol. 11, Sec, 156, p. 1092 states:
"It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his
own property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but
can prevent his creditors from reaching it." Scott, p. 1094,
specifically cites Sec. 25-1-11 UCA as a statutory embodiment of this general principle. The Anderson trust
is in fact restated by Scott at Sec. 156.2, p, 1099:
"Where by the terms of the trust the trustee
is to pay the settlor as much of the income and
principal as the trustee may in his absolute discretion determine, and as to any income and
principal not so paid there is a gift over to such
persons as the settlor may appoint and in default of appointment to the settlor's estate, his
creditors can reach the whole of the trust property. (Citing Cooke Trust Co, Ltd. v. Lord, 41
Hawaii 198 (1955) and ALI Restatement
of
Trusts 2d, Sec. 156). Clearly the policy which
prevents a person from creating a spendthrift
trust for his own benefit also prevents him from
depriving his creditors of a right to reach the
trust property by creating a discretionary trust."
Appellants have argued that the Anderson Trust
created vested interests in children and grandchildren
and that those interests should be superior to and insulated from the claims of creditors of Mrs. Anderson.
Sec. 25-1-11 UCA looks solely at the grantor's lifetime
benefits and use of trust property, and disposition on
death of grantor is immaterial under the statute. In
any event, under the Anderson Trust, the grantor reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tained the option to vary final disposition by the provisions of Paragraph VI of the Trust Agreement (R.92).
There on sale of family stocks, as approved by the grantor, the grantor could then determine whether the sale
proceeds should go to one or another of different
classes of beneficiaries. Under this provision there could
be no vesting of any interest since the Grantor retained
a future option.
!

Defendants have cited DiMaria v. Bank of California, 23 Cal. App. 2d 254, 46 Cal. Rptr. 924, (1965) as a case
on all fours with the Anderson Trust because of a weak
grantor with a profligate child in each situation. The
DiMaria case was an attempt by a creditor, who had been
the attorney of the grantor, Mrs. Walton, in an unsuccessful action by the grantor to avoid her irrevocable
trust, to reach trust assets for payment of his fee. No
statute such as Sec. 25-1-11 UCA was involved and no
spendthrift clause was in the Walton Trust. The California court allowed DiMaria, the creditor, to reassert
his claims on a proper showing of discretionary powers
in the Trustee. The court, in fact, reasserted the law regarding grantor's benefit trusts as set out in Greenwich Trust Co. vs. Tyson, infra, and Sec. 156, ALI Restatement of Trusts 2nd, infra, saying:
"Under these circumstances it is understandable
why the court should conclude that the trustee
was a mere subterfuge to insure against the unbridled financial demands of the settlor and at
the same time insulate his estate against the just
claims of creditors.''
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Vesting was not at issue or involved in the DiMaria case.
Sec. 21-1-11 UCA is crystal clear in its language and
meaning. Respondent is a subsequent creditor, and under
the statute he should be able to reach trust assets to the
extent of the personal property included.
POINT II
THE TRUST AGREEMENT PROVIDES
FOR THE PRIMARY USE AND BENEFIT
OF THE GRANTOR
The Trust Agreement gives the grantor full lifetime
benefits from the trust property. The instrument speaks
for itself.
The following clear cut benefits and uses for Norma
Anderson, the grantor, of the trust estate are set out in
the following cited paragraphs of the Trust Agreement
(R.88-97).
1. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall pay to or for the
benefit of the Grantor such portions of the income and
principal of this trust as may be necessary to maintain
the grantor in a reasonable standard of living after taking into consideration other income received by the
grantor. In determining the standard of living to be
maintained, the Trustee shall use as a rule of guide the
standard of living of the grantor of the date of the execution of this agreement." (R.88).
2. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall provide for a new
automobile for the grantor approximately every two or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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three years, and then only on the request of the
(Emphasis ours) (R.88).

grantor"

3. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall further provide for
vacations for the grantor and a companion to be selected
by the grantor." (R.88).
4. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall provide sufficient
funds to maintain grantor's home." (R.88).
5. Paragraph II. "With relation to the home of
Grantor, the Trustee shall sell said home at such time
as requested to sell by the grantor and thereafter provide for the grantor reasonable accomodations after taking into consideration grantor's health and the degree of
care that may be required to maintain her in a comfortable and reasonable standard. Distributions shall be
made from time to time as trustee deems provident, but
not less frequently than quarterly." (Emphasis ours)
(R.88).
6. Paragraph VI. "The trustee shall retain grantor's family home until Grantor shall indicate that she
no longer desires to live in the same or until it would
be provident in Trustee's sole discretion to remove grantor permanently from the home and place her in surroundings where proper care can be administered." (Emphasis ours) (R.92).
7. Paragraph VI. The Trustee shall retain as investments stock in Chuck Wagon Corporations and Anderson Enterprises, Inc., in which corporations Norma
Anderson has admitted to have owned controlling inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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terests. If it becomes necessary to liquidate either of
those shares "the trustee shall so advise grantor and sell
the same if grantor approves of the sales terms." (Emphasis ours) (R.92)
8. Paragraph VI. On sale of Chuck Wagon or Anderson Enterprises stock by trustee, the proceeds of sale
will become a part of the residue of the trust estate,
which would be distributed on Mrs. Anderson's death to
her grandson and her daughter under Paragraph IV(5)
and (6) of the Trust Agreement (R.92). But, Mrs. Anderson may indicate that the sale proceeds shall be substituted for the assets sold and ultimately distributed
to the different distributees who would have received
those shares of stock under Paragraph IV (3), (4), (5)
and (6) of the Trust Agreement (R.92). In other words,
Mrs. Anderson can vary at a future time the testamentary disposition of the trust assets.
9. Paragraph VI. "So long as reasonably provident,
Trustee shall vote stock held by it so as to maintain
grantor as an officer, director and employee of Anderson Enterprises, Inc., and Andy's Chuck Wagon Corporation and related corporations," (R.92).
10. Paragraph VII-9. Grantor may appoint a successor trustee upon Valley Bank's resignation (R.93).
11. Paragraph V I I I . The Spendthrift provision provides "No payment or share of the Grantor or any 'Beneficiary' shall in any manner be liable to the creditors
thereof or subject to legal process, and the Trustee is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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directed in all events to make payments directly to grantor or Beneficiary or for their benefit." (R.94).
We submit that under the Trust Agreement grantor
has every lifetime use and benefit from the trust property that she had before creating the trust, plus the
protective and prudent hand of the trustee to guide her
in her continuing business enterprises. Her high standard
of living and enjoyment is directed to be continued by
the trustee. She has continuing control of the family
corporation affairs (R.171), including receipt of a generous salary from those corporations. (R.159-161). She
has retained an option as to choice of the ultimate beneficiaries on her death, in the event of liquidation of
stocks; thus there was no possible vesting of those interests. All of these uses and benefits of the trust assets
are retained in Mrs. Anderson at the expense of her
creditors, existing and subsequent, by way of the spendthrift provision (R.94). No other beneficiaries can have
any uses or benefits until Mrs. Anderson's death.
Appellants argue that the trustee has discretions as
to payments or benefits to be made to Norma Anderson. However, appellants ignore the fact that the trustee
is bound to consider and honor the matters for decision
as retained by the grantor, namely, (1) request for a
new automobile, (2) request to sell her residence, (3)
change her place of residence, (4) her approval of sales
of family stocks, and (5) her variance of disposition on
her death of proceeds of sales of stocks. The trustee is
directed to maintain the grantor in the same standard
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of living as at the time of the creation of the trust. There
was no real change in her enjoyment or the use of her
properties.
POINT III
THE TRUST HAS, IN FACT, OPERATED
FOR THE PRIMARY USE AND BENEFIT
OF THE GRANTOR.
Testimony of Mrs. Anderson and Rex Guymon, Valley Bank trust officer, showed that the following disbursements have been made to or for the use and benefit
of Norma Anderson:
1. $1,000.00 paid to Norma Anderson for her attorney's fee (R.176).
2. $5,000.00 paid to Norma Anderson to pay a debt
and to protect her interest in Chuck Wagon stock
(R.176).
3. $500.00 paid to Norma Anderson to buy a new
automobile (R.177,182).
4. Payment by trustee of taxes (R.181-182), insurance and other expenses of maintenance, improvements
(R.184) and mortgage payments (R.181-182) on the personal residence of Norma Anderson at 1050 Millbert Avenue (R.82).
5. Mrs. Anderson has continued to have free use of
her residence at 1050 Millbert Avenue. (R.183).
6. A salary of betwen $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 per
month has been paid directly to Norma Anderson by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Andy's Enterprises, o\^ u. uie corporations controlled
by the trustee (R.161).
An objective full view of the trust certainly shows
that its purpose was to give the grantor all of the benefits and uses of the trust property that she had before
its creation. She has, in fact, used the residence by continuing to live there, with the trustee paying all expenses
of its maintenance. She has continued to have all of the
use of the family stocks by her personal control and salary provision, as provided in the Trust Agreement. She
has all of the continuing uses and benefits during her
lifetime. "Use", benefit" and "advantage" are shown
as synonyms in Websters Third International Dictionary. Mrs. Anderson in addition was protected from the
demands and indiscretions of her son, David, and from
the rights of her creditors, existing and subsequent.
We submit that Section 25-1-11 UCA in being entitled "Trust for Grantor" and in pointing at a "trust
for the use of the person making the same" refers to
"use" as in the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd
Edition, p.1788:
"The 'use' of a thing means that one is to enjoy,,
hold, occupy, or have some manner of benefit
thereof. Use also means usefulness, advantage,
productive of benefit."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT IV
BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIFIC SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION, THE TRUST IS VOID
AS TO RESPONDENT AS A CREDITOR
OF THE GRANTOR
The Anderson Trust Agreement specifically insulates Mrs. Anderson and the trust property from her creditors, past, present and future, with the following provision :
"VIII. Spendthrift Provision. Neither Grantor nor any 'Beneficiary' of this trust shall have
the power to anticipate, transfer, sell, assign or
encumber any payment, distribution or interest
in this trust, and any attempt to so do shall be.'
. void and ineffective. No payment or share of the
Grantor or any 'Beneficiary' shall in any manner
be liable to the creditors thereof or subject to
legal process, and the Trustee is directed in all
events to make payments directly to the Grantor
or 'Beneficiary' or for their benefit." (R.94).
The law is clear and public policy is firmly opposed
to the possibility of the beneficial owner of property
placing that property beyond the reach of his creditors.
A spendthrift trust for the benefit of the grantor himself is uniformly held entirely illegal, and the creditors
can reach all of the trust property. 37 AmJur 2d 720,
Sec.27.
The general rule is stated at 89 C.J.S. 745, Section
26:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"A spendthrift trust for the benefit of the donor,
during life, is invalid, both as to past and future creditors, (citing Nelson v. California Trust Co., and Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A2d
166 (1949), even though there is a provision for a contingent remainder in a third person."
Following are general statements of the rule:
"A man cannot put his own property beyond the
reach of creditors and at the same time reserve substantial interests in it or control over it." Griswold,
Spendthrift Trusts, p.543.
"The cases are uniform in holding that quite apart
from statute, a person cannot create a spendthrift trust
for himself which shall be effective against the rights
of his subsequent creditors." 44 Harvard Law Review
205 (Erwin Griswold).
"Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts
are permitted, the settlor cannot create a spendthrift
trust for his own benefit. It is immaterial that in creating the trust the settlor did not intend to defraud his
creditors. It is immaterial that he was solvent at the
time of creation of the trust." Scott on Trusts, Vol. II,
Sec. 156, p. 1092.
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (2d Ed.), Sec. 223, at
p. 665, states: "If a settlor creates a trust for his own
benefit and inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far
as then existing or future creditors are concerned, and
they can reach his interest under the trust." Cited are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc. and State ex reL v.
Nashville Trust Co., both infra; also, Spring Street Corp.
v. Walsh, 101 P.2d 783 (Calif., 1940).
The above general statements of the law and public
'policy are followed in many cases set out in the notes
to 119 ALR 35 and 34 ALR 2d 1342. The cases cited
uniformly hold that the grantor cannot by a direction
to the trustee avoid or hinder his own creditors by a
provision as in the Anderson Trust.
Nelson v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 501, 202
P.2d 1021 (1949), is a case on all fours with the Anderson Trust. The judgment creditor sought to reach the
assets of a spendthrift trust created by his judgment
debtor. The debtor contended that he had no interest in
the property except to receive the net income and that
the creditor was in no better position than he was. The
California court held that all of the trust property was
subject to the claim of the creditor, and it said:
"It is against public policy to permit a man
to tie up his property in such a way that he can
enjoy it but prevent his creditors from reaching
it, and where the settlor makes himself a beneficiary of a trust any restraints in the instrument
on the involuntary alienation of his interest are
invalid and ineffective."
Cited with approval in the Nelson case is McColgan
v. Walker Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 P. 995 (1916),
where the California court held that a spendthrift trust
attempted to be created in the settlor's own favor is invalid, even though he had no fraudulent intend toward
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his creditors. See also In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal. App.
2d 104, 172 P.2d 547 (1946), and In State ex. rel. Caldwell v. NasJiville Trust Co. 23 Tenn. App. 388, 190 SW
2d 785 (1944). The Tennessee court distinguished a
spendthrift trust for the benefit of third parties from
a trust for the benefit of the grantor, saying:
"But the case is very different when one
takes his own property and undertakes to put
it into a trust for his own benefit beyond the reach
of his creditors. Such a trust would take from
them what they would have had a right to look
to for payment of their debts. It violates not only
the general principle that one's property is liable
for his debts but also the law of fraudulent conveyance. All the authorities say that one cannot
create a spendthrift trust with his own property
for his own benefit."
We have found no Utah law regarding spendthrift
provisions which place the grantor's property beyond
the reach of his creditors. In Cronquist v. Utah State
Agricultural College 114 U. 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949),
the court had before it the propriety of a voluntary alienation by a testamentary trust beneficiary, not the
grantor. No creditors' rights were involved. The Utah
court raised questions of semantics - what is a spendthrift trust and what language creates one? The court
entirely by-passed the question of the validity of spendthrift trusts, particularly regarding the rights of creditors of a grantor, in saying:
"This opinion is not to be construed as a holding by implication that spendthrift trusts are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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valid in Utah to any extent. As to that question,
we express no opinion. I t must await an occasion
where a spendthrift trust was intended to be
created."
There are two separate facets to the spendthrift
trust. We are not questioning the right to make property
not subject to voluntary alienation. The other facet, the
provision for the shield against creditors, we do attack and contend is illegal. We are not suggesting
that the entire trust agreement is invalid because of the
spendthrift provision, as Appellants suggest (Ap.Br.
9,22). The grantor can do ultimately whatever she wishes
with her property, but she cannot beat her creditors by
a secret trust, or with a direction to the trustee not to
pay her creditors. There will be no revolution in the
trust business after this decision as Appellants suggest
(Ap.Br.22), only an affirmation of the rights of creditors.
The general rule as to creditors' rights is refined
in A L I Restatement of Trusts 2nd Sec. 156, p. 326, as
follows:
"156 W H E R E T H E SETTLOR I S A B E N E FICIARY.
(1) Where a person creates for his own
benefit a trust with a provision restraining the
voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest,
his transferee or creditors can reach his interests.
(2) Where a person creates for his own
benefit a trust for support or a discretionary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the
terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for
his benefit."
The very inclusion of the spendthrift provision in
avoidance of grantor's creditors makes the trust fraudulent and invalid as to subsequent creditors and a part
of a scheme with a clear purpose of placing property
beyond the reach of his creditors. See 93 ALR 1213. In
the Anderson Trust the spendthrift provision is expressly for the protection and insulation of the grantor as
against her own creditors. By the terms of the trust all
of the assets can be used and have been used for the
benefit of the grantor, and the entire trust is void as
against respondent as a creditor of the grantor.
POINT V
RESPONDENT IS NOT BARRED, EITHER
UNDER SECTION 25-1-11 UCA OR THE
SPENDTHRIFT P R O V I S I O N , BY ANY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Appellants argued that respondent should in some
way be barred by the three year limitation in Section
78-12-26(4) UCA which provides:
"(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state."
They urge that respondent should have made investigation to determine whether Mrs. Anderson had diDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vested herself of her assets into a trust and finally that
recording of the Anderson deeds to the trustee should
have given constructive notice to respondent and thereby bar him.
Section 78-12-26(4) UCA is in no way applicable
to respondent's cause of action under Section 25-1-11
UCA. That statute does not create a cause of action or
liability within the meaning of Sec. 75-12-26(4). Sec.
25-1-11 UCA simply declares certain transactions void.
Respondent commenced his action, both under Sec.
25-1-11 UCA and to avoid the spendthrift trust provision
as soon as he had information regarding the existence
of the trust and when he found he could not collect his
prior judgment otherwise personally from Mrs. Anderson. The Anderson Trust was indeed a secret trust, as
shown by the testimony of Rex Guymon, Valley Bank
trust officer, that even if respondent had called the bank
inquiring as to the existence of any trust with Mrs. Anderson, respondent would not have been advised if anyone, including Mrs. Anderson, had a trust, because of
the policy of the bank (R.184).
The record shows that the Anderson real property
was, in fact, transferred to NAVALCO, the nominee of
of the Trustee, with no designation of NAVALCO as a
trustee for anyone (R.175,184). Recording of those deeds
could not possibly be construed as notice to respondent
of the existence of a trust as to either real or personal
property.
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CONCLUSION
Judge Sawaya should be affirmed in his decision
that:
1. The Anderson Trust Agreement was, in fact? for
the use and benefit of Norma Anderson, the grantor.
2. As to personal property, therein, the Trust
Agreement is void under Sec. 25-1-11 UCA as to respondent as a creditor of the grantor.
3. Because of the spendthrift provision in the Trust
Agreement, the trust is void as to respondent as a creditor of the grantor.
4. Judgment for $14,680.68, interest and costs
should be affirmed to respondent.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

JAMES W. BELESS
WALLACE D. HURD
1011 Walker Bank Building
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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